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Whitewashing Ethnic Cleansing: How the narrative around Western Tigray obscures a crime in plain sight

For nearly five years, Tigrayans from Western Tigray have endured a calculated campaign of ethnic cleansing, orchestrated through brutality, violence, displacement, and occupation. Yet despite the scale and brutality of the crimes committed, Western Tigray continues to be described casually and dangerously as “contested” or “disputed,” and worse, as the object of a so-called “fight over sesame.”

These terms are not only misleading they are an assault on truth itself. They constitute a deliberate, strategic mischaracterization of a crisis that has involved mass killings, systemic rape, the forced expulsion of civilians, the obliteration of local identity and the permanent redrawing of demographic lines through violence.

The issue of Western Tigray is not a border disagreement. It is not a two sided conflict and it is certainly not about a crop.

Language as a Weapon of Obfuscation

To understand how this false narrative has endured, one must begin with the language itself. The term “contested” implies two parties with equal claims. It implies the existence of legitimate grievances on both sides.

But there is no symmetry here. One side was ethnically cleansed. One side was expelled, their homes looted or burned, their lands seized, their existence criminalized. The other side now administers the area by force, with full impunity and growing normalization.

Since 2020, Western Tigray has been militarily annexed by the Amhara forces and is still under the control of the Amhara regional government and the vigilante Fano militias.

Tigrayans were systematically expelled from Western Tigray in what human rights organizations and the U.S. State Department described as a coordinated campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Entire towns were emptied. Men were executed and detained. Women were raped and survivors displaced across makeshift camps in different parts of Tigray or sent fleeing toward the Sudanese border, carrying nothing but memory and grief.

To continue calling such a place “contested” is to participate in a deception. It is to turn a crime scene into a policy debate.

The narrative of “contest” is not neutral, it is the language of the occupier. It serves to launder illegality into legitimacy, making permanent what was meant to be temporary, and concealing force behind the illusion of rivalry.

The Sesame fixation: Commodifying brutal ethnic cleansing

Parallel to this, an equally grotesque framing that has gained currency is the idea that the violence in Western Tigray is somehow rooted in economic motives, specifically a struggle over sesame, one of the most lucrative cash crops.

In this framing, the crisis is reduced to a resource dispute, as though the forced removal of an entire ethnic population is equivalent to a land competition between rival farmers. This narrative, too, is not accidental. It flattens political violence into economic logic. It replaces the moral clarity of injustice with the convenience of market rationality.

But no one rapes women or burns down churches to plant sesame. No one imprisons young men or razes entire neighborhoods for the sake of harvest quotas. The campaign in Western Tigray was not agricultural it was annihilative. It sought not only to take land, but to erase the people to whom it belonged.

The economic explanation is a cover story. A convenient fiction designed to allow outside actors, governments, NGOs, investors to continue engaging with the region without confronting the truth of what made that access possible.

A crime hidden in plain sight: The media’s failure and International complicity

Western Tigray has not been a silent tragedy. The expulsions, the massacres, the mass rapes, the destruction of villages, and the cries of survivors all have been visible, documented, and at times even acknowledged. And yet, despite the mountain of evidence and the clarity of these horrors, a disturbing pattern has continued to be chosen by both local and international media outlets, Humanitarian NGOs and international organizations. The persistent and deliberate mischaracterization of the area as “contested.”

This framing is not just inaccurate, it is profoundly irresponsible. It transforms a campaign of ethnic cleansing into a border disagreement. It flattens war crimes into a policy dispute. And it enables those responsible to continue their project under the cover of legitimacy, while the world debates maps instead of justice.

News organizations, some of the most trusted names in journalism, have repeatedly defaulted to vague, euphemistic language that fails to convey the scale and intent of what has happened. Articles speak of “territorial disputes,” “Amhara-Tigray tensions,” or “competition over fertile land,” as though what’s unfolding is a bureaucratic misunderstanding rather than a violent erasure of a population.

This editorial hedging is not neutrality, it is cowardice masked as balance. And it has consequences. By failing to name the crimes for what they are, the media has played a role in shaping global perceptions that excuse inaction. By presenting the aggressors and victims as equivalent stakeholders in a “contested” space, the press has elevated the narrative of the perpetrators and buried the voices of the displaced.

International humanitarian organizations are equally culpable. They continue to repeat the term “contested.”

This language is not benign. It is not technical. It is a political act. To describe the horrors of Western Tigray as “contested” is to rewrite history in real-time.

International organizations know what happened in Western Tigray. They are staffed with experts. They have access to the data, the reports, the testimonies. And yet, they choose language that prioritizes political access over moral clarity. Whether out of fear of offending the Ethiopian government, or in an effort to maintain a working relationship with regional authorities, the result is the same: truth is sacrificed at the altar of diplomacy.

The use of “contested” is not a clerical error. It is complicity.

When a UN agency or international NGO publishes a report referring to Western Tigray as “contested,” it validates the claim of those who seized the land and drove out its people. It rewrites a brutal military takeover as a misunderstanding between neighbors. It tells the world—without saying it out loud—that ethnic cleansing is negotiable.

This is more than just terminology. It is an act of moral abandonment. It abandons the displaced, the raped, the grieving, the disappeared. It leaves them not only without justice, but without recognition. It pushes their suffering into the footnotes of geopolitics.

Words shape policy. Words inform funding, humanitarian response, legal strategy, and diplomatic positioning. To call Western Tigray “contested” is to make future return less likely. It is to allow time to harden facts on the ground. It is to pretend that both sides should be heard—when only one side has been silenced by force.

If international organizations are serious about justice, about peace, about non-recurrence, they must begin with language. That means calling things by their rightful names.

Western Tigray is not contested. It is occupied. The violence was not spontaneous, it was systematic.

Anything less is a lie dressed up in the language of diplomacy.

Why This Matters Now

Five years on, the danger of this narrative is greater than ever. The longer the language of “dispute” prevails, the more permanent the occupation becomes. The more the story is told as a fight over land or crops, the further the world drifts from recognizing that what happened in Western Tigray was a deliberate dismantling of an ethnic community’s right to exist in its own homeland.

What is at stake is not just justice for past crimes, but the foundation of any possible peace. A peace that begins with silence, erasure, and lies is no peace at all—it is the prelude to recurrence.

The people of Western Tigray deserve to return not only to their land, but to their names, their history, and the full recognition of what was done to them. That cannot happen as long as the world insists on calling war crimes a “contest” and ethnic cleansing a “dispute over sesame.”

Truth as a Prerequisite for Justice

The truth is simple. Western Tigray is not contested, it is occupied. The conflict is not about sesame, it is about the violent removal of a people from their ancestral land. And the ongoing denial of these facts is not ignorance, it is complicity.

History is watching. The survivors are still speaking. And the record must be corrected while there is still time to do so with integrity.

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Is Tigray Witnessing a Creeping Coup?

Following the announcement by the senior military leaders, there are growing concerns that what started as a political dispute within the TPLF is evolving into a creeping coup.

On January 23, 2025, Tigray politics has seen a dramatic escalation in its internal power dynamics.

On that day Senior military commanders declared their backing for the faction led by former Tigray president and Chairman of the TPLF, Debretsion Gebremichael, calling for the restructuring of the Interim Administration and giving recognition for one faction only.

On their statement the senior military commander has accused the interim administration of being a group of “traitors working with the enemy,”

Following this announcement by the military leaders there are growing concerns that what started as a political dispute within the TPLF is evolving into a creeping coup that could destabilize Tigray and have wider implications in Ethiopia and the region.

A glimpse into the power struggle within the TPLF

After the signing of the Pretoria agreement the TPLF has been grappling with internal party disputes and divisions.

The first rift in the TPLF’s leadership began to appear right after the signing of the Pretoria agreement which declared the election held in Tigray as null and void and demanded the establishment of an interim administration.

Many party members accused Getachew and his team of conspiring to dismantle the regional government led by Debretsion Gebremichael.

Despite the opposition to the decision by many members of the party, later it was agreed to dismantle the government and establish an interim administration. However months long tensions within the party have continued regarding who will lead the Interim administration.

Even if many party members choosing Debretsion to continue leading the region, Federal government refused to accept him which led to another round of election process in the party which ended up choosing Getachew as the new President for Tigray.

After his election what seems like a peaceful power transition was seen but the internal power struggle has intensified, with one attempting to delegitimize the other and assume full control over political power.

During public meetings and media briefing Getachew Reda, President of the Interim administration has been accusing a group led from the TPLF office of trying to undermine the interim administration and control the lower government structure.

This division has escalated into splitting the party into two factions following a controversial party congress last year.

Following the controversial congress the dispute escalated into a chock hold power struggle between the faction led by Debretsion Gebremichael and Getachew Reda.

After the congress Debretsions faction announced that it has removed senior officials from the interim administration including Getachew Reda and assigned new people to various positions except the President position.

The faction that held a congress vowed to assume full control of the power it says it has lost. During a town hall meeting with the party members in Mekelle, Fetlewerk Gebregziabher, senior leader in the TPLF said “We are now kicked out of power and we need to reclaim that back.” and vows to fight until this is achieved.

This has led to power grabbing in the lower level of the government in the Woredas, zone and Kebelles paralyzing the interim administration and escalating tensions.

A Coup Without Guns

A creeping coup is a subtle but effective form of power grab, often slower and less overt than a traditional military takeover.

Rather than storming government buildings or seizing offices overnight, It starts with the gradual erosion of institutional authority, a political narrative that seeks to justify the change, and strategic efforts to consolidate control without a single dramatic move. The result is a change in power that maybe harder to notice but no less impactful.

The Signs of a Creeping Coup in Tigray

Debretsion’s faction now has already succeeded in gaining almost full control of lower government structures. According to many observers, at the woreda and zone levels, key bureaus and local councils are now aligned with Debretsion’s camp.

This grassroots infiltration of political structures is one of the most insidious aspects of the creeping coup. By controlling local councils, his faction is weakening the authority of Getachew’s Interim administration at the grassroots level and cementing its own support base.

And after the recent announcement by the military, calling for the dissolution and restructuring of the region’s interim administration Debretsion’s faction is shifting its focus to controlling strategic institutions.

According to a report by BBC Amharic days after the announcement by the military, attempts were made by militias to seize the Mekelle radio station, a tool usually used to influence the wider public, and install a new leader loyal to Debretsion’s faction.

Meanwhile, efforts are also underway to control the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), a powerful economic conglomerate that has long been the financial backbone of TPLF governance in Tigray.

According to several sources the military had also began holding meetings with lower-ranking officers in different army’s to “build consensus” around the decisions it passed.

Historical Parallels

What we are witnessing in Tigray is not an isolated event but a part of a historical pattern.

A creeping coup is often defined by gradual erosion rather than sudden explosions of violence. We’ve seen this before in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa: the slow dismantling of government systems from within, where the military, once seen as the protector of the state, turns into an instrument for subversion.

The most striking historical example is Ethiopia’s own Derg regime in 1974. In a process that took months, the military systematically dismantled the monarchy’s control, using its growing influence to steadily erode the Emperor’s authority. While there was no single moment of violence that overthrew Haile Selassie, the Derg slowly choked the life out of his rule.

A Region on the Brink

Tigray’s fragile peace, achieved through the Pretoria Agreement, is now at risk. What began as a political factional dispute may soon spiral into an irreversible power shift, that could reshape Tigray’s political landscape in ways that may not be fully understood until it is too late.

The question is not whether a power shift is happening, but who will ultimately emerge as Tigray’s leader and at what cost to its fragile peace?

The Ethiopian federal government, has so far refrained from directly intervening in TPLF’s internal power struggle.

Addis has preferred a wait and see approach, hoping that internal TPLF divisions will prevent any faction from gaining full control. However, if the current situation escalates, federal forces could justify intervention in the pretext of maintaining stability and insuring law enforcement.

And such interventions from the Federal government may enable other actors to take advantage and try to exploit the situation by taking sides and turning Tigray into a battle ground.

The time for all Tigrayans to unite and force the politicians to bring back their differences to the table is now. In action from Tigrayans is driving Tigray into a brink of collapse no one will benefit from. Everyone must act now beforeit is too late.

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UN faces criticism for normalizing military occupation, sanitizing ethnic cleansing and war crimes in Tigray.

The United Nations humanitarian coordination agency, has come under growing criticism from Tigrayans after it referred to constitutionally recognized Tigrayan territories as “contested” in a recent mapping update.

The map which is part of OCHA’s latest humanitarian report labeled Western, Northwestern, and Southern Tigray as contested areas,” a description that many say is both factually incorrect and politically dangerous.

Critics are accusing the UN agency of whitewashing war crimes, sanitizing forced occupation, and undermining Ethiopia’s own constitutional order.

Many argue that these territories are not contested. They are part of Tigray by law of the land, by federal delineation and by historical record.

What the Constitution Says And What the War Changed

The Ethiopian federal constitution, still in force today, recognizes Tigray as one of the country’s regional states with clearly demarcated boundaries, which include the Western, Northwestern, and Southern zones.

These territories were administered by the Tigray regional government until they were forcibly seized in late 2020 following the outbreak of war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Since then, Amhara regional forces, with the backing of the federal military and later Eritrean troops, have taken control of these areas, committing what multiple international human rights organizations have described as crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Ethnic Tigrayans were driven out en masse, villages were razed, and civilians were executed or detained in what Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and U.S State Department called a campaign of ethnic cleansing.”

Over two million Tigrayans were displaced during the war, with many of those from Western Tigray still barred from returning to their homes due to the continued occupation of their lands, a direct violation of their constitutional rights and of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in November 2022.

To now refer to these areas as “contested,” critics argue, is to legitimize the results of gross human rights abuses, violence, massive eviction and military occupation.

OCHA’s “Contested” classification: A dangerous precedent

By labeling these territories as “contested,” OCHA appears to adopt the language of occupation. One that aligns, intentionally or not, with those who benefited from the wartime redrawing of borders through force.

For many survivors of the ethnic cleansing campaign, the designation of their homeland as “contested” feels like a second dispossession. one not carried out with guns, but with maps, jargon, and diplomatic double-speak.

For them this map is not just a map. It is a political statement and ignoring the suffering of Tigrayans in the name of humanitarian pragmatism.

“These are not contested lands. These are the homes we were driven out of, the lands where our parents were buried, the towns where we were born,” said Gidey, a displaced resident of Humera now living in 70 Kare IDP camp in Mekelle. “The UN should be helping us go home, not rewriting the story.”

Pretoria Agreement: A Promise Still Unkept

The Pretoria agreement, signed in November 2022 between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, promised to address underlying issues including the withdrawal of non-ENDF forces from Tigray, the return of displaced persons and the reestablishment of constitutional order.

But more than two years after the agreement was signed, non-ENDF forces remain in control of areas like Western Tigray where millions of Tigrayans were expelled or fled in fear and the millions of displaced Tigrayans remain in camps or host communities, unable to return.

Analysts warn that such framing could further embolden actors seeking to redraw Ethiopia’s internal boundaries through conflict, and risk undermining the fragile Pretoria peace agreement.

The United Nations humanitarian coordination agency has not issued a formal response to the growing criticism.

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Tigray’s internally displaced persons says they are trapped between a broken peace and a forgotten war

Hundreds of thousands of displaced Tigrayans are preparing to return home to the occupied areas of Western Tigray, North Western & Eastern Tigray, despite persistent threats of violence, forced occupation, and a lack of protection.

This warning, issued by the Tsilal Civil Society of Western Tigray, comes amid worsening conditions in IDP camps across Tigray.

Many of the IDPs have lost hope and are preparing to return on their own fully unprotected and facing grave danger, the organization said in a letter sent to foreign embassies. If nothing is done, we fear a bloodbath and potential for broader conflict, the organization warned.

The civil society’s call comes amid a rise in desperation inside the displacement sites, where food shortages, illness and trauma coupled with lack of political solution have pushed families toward what many describe as a “last resort.”

More than two years after Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF signed a peace deal to end one of the world’s deadliest wars in recent memory, close to a million people in Tigray remain displaced, many of them trapped in overcrowded schools, abandoned buildings, or makeshift camps.

Their homes and land particularly in Western Tigray and also areas bordering Eritrea remain inaccessible and occupied. The continued occupation has resulted one of the world’s most neglected displacement crises, happening largely away from international headlines.

The primary obstacle for IDPs to return to their homes, is the ongoing occupation by Amhara and Eritrean forces. Though the Pretoria Agreement called for the withdrawal of “non-ENDF and foreign forces”, these forces remain in large parts of Tigray.

According to the Tigray Interim Administration President, Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede, 40% of Tigray constitutionally recognized administrative territories of Tigray remain under continued military occupation, leaving nearly one million Tigrayans leave in displacement for nearly 5 years.

A Humanitarian emergency, Under the radar

While global attention has shifted to conflicts in Gaza, Sudan, Ukraine and now Israeli-Iran conflict, the humanitarian crisis in Tigray has quietly worsened.

Reports by several media outlets reveals hundreds of hunger and death related deaths across the IDPs camps in Tigray.

According to previous report by Wegahta, In Mekelle 70 kare, one of the largest camp in Tigray, over 16 IDPs died in three months, due to hunger, lack of medicine, and preventable disease. Children’s in the IDP camps are suffering from acute malnutrition.

Similarly in Axum and Shire, reports say that the death toll is alarmingly increasing.

International aid agencies acknowledge the growing needs but say they are severely underfunded. “We are operating on minimal resources and cannot meet the scale of the crisis,” said one humanitarian official at IOM, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Shelter conditions are also deteriorating. In several sites, IDPs live in abandoned schools, a situation that has disrupted local education and forced students to learn in temporary open-air spaces.

Fragile Peace, growing frustrations

The slow implementation of the Pretoria Agreement has triggered growing tensions between the TPLF and the federal authorities in Addis Ababa.

TPLF has been making repeated accusations against the federal government of not only failing to uphold key terms of the deal, including the safe return of displaced people and the withdrawal of Amhara and Eritrean forces but also violating the terms of the agreement.

In a weekly statement issued on June 8, Tigray’s People’s Liberation Front, said instead of withdrawing non-federal forces from Tigray, the Federal gov’t is “strengthening their presence in various ways”

The Federal government also made similar accusations against the TPLF, accusing the party of undermining the Pretoria agreement.

Observers warn that the deepening mistrust and lack of transparency and robust monitoring method on the implementation of the agreement could jeopardize the already fragile peace.

Meanwhile, displaced families say they are running out of time and patience. “We don’t have food, we don’t have homes, and we don’t have hope,” said one displaced man living in Mekelle. “We would rather die trying to return than stay here.”

On June 11, Internally displaced Tigrayans stormed the Interim administration office and held a meeting demanding the administration to address their concerns and respond to their demands.

During the meeting, Amanuel Assefa, deputy President of the Interim administration said “This time, we are determined to return our displaced people through the peace framework,” however many IDPs says they are tired of broken promises from the authorities.

On June 18–20, 2025, a three consecutive day protest is set to take place in the regional capital, Mekelle, and Geneva, Switzerland under the slogan “Enough of Spending Rainy Seasons in Tents,” demanding the withdrawal of non-ENDF and foreign forces from Tigray, the return to their home and the full implementation of the Pretoria agreement

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Fear of another war in the Horn of Africa is looming as Ethiopia and Eritrea trade escalating accusations

Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have reached a new high as both governments accuse each other of provocations, territorial violations and preparations for renewed war, raising fears that the fragile Horn of Africa could once again descend into open conflict.

In a formal diplomatic communiqué to the United Nations and several heads of state, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Eritrea of arming rebel groups, occupying sovereign Ethiopian territory, and committing human rights violations against civilians.

Addis Ababa warned that Asmara is preparing for a military offensive in the summer and called on the international community to intervene, demanding that “Eritrean troops withdraw from Ethiopian and stop intervening in its internal affairs.”

“The Ethiopian government will take all necessary measures to defend its sovereignty, peace, and security,” the ministry said.

Eritrea swiftly rejected the claims, with Eritrea’s Ministry of Information describing the allegations as “preposterous lies” and accusing Addis Ababa of orchestrating a “calculated disinformation campaign” to justify military aggression. “This is a transparent ploy to hoodwink the international community and rationalize a new wave of hostility,” the statement said.

Fragile Peace, Mounting Risks

In June, 2018, the world celebrated the surprise rapprochement between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, a move that got Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize. But the peace has proved brittle, and many now agree that it was little more than a tactical alliance to wage war against Tigray.

Following the signing of the Pretoria Peace Agreement in late 2022, tensions between Addis Ababa and Asmara have quietly returned. Eritrea, which was not a signatory to the accord, has viewed the agreement with suspicion.

During an interview with Eritrean state media, President Isaias lamented that the Pretoria deal had “stopped” Eritrea’s plans, accusing the U.S. of imposing the agreement to curtail its regional ambitions.

Tensions between the two countries have been further inflamed by Ethiopia’s calls for sovereign access to the Red Sea, a demand Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has described as “existential.”

Ethiopia, landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade. But recent rhetoric from Addis Ababa hinting at strategic, historical, and even security based claims for direct coastal access has unsettled neighboring countries.

Although Ethiopia has not explicitly named Eritrean ports in its ambitions, the message has been interpreted by Asmara as a veiled threat. Eritrean officials have responded with alarm, warning against any attempts to alter regional borders or challenge Eritrea’s sovereignty.

The sea access issue has transformed an already tense relationship into a potential geopolitical powder keg and the risk is not just war between two nations it’s the regionalization of that conflict.

Is a Proxy War Brewing in the Horn?

The Horn of Africa, one of the most volatile and strategically contested regions in the world, is bracing for a potential return to war as Ethiopia and Eritrea trade increasingly aggressive accusations and mobilize their political and military machinery.

The Horn of Africa is viewed as a geopolitical chessboard, with global and regional powers jostling for influence. The United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Russia, China, and Western nations all have military or commercial interests in Red Sea access points, ports, and inland corridors.

With so many players involved, there is growing concern that the Horn could become the next theater for a deadly proxy war, especially if a direct Ethiopia–Eritrea war is going to erupt.

The region has all the ingredients of a future proxy war. Weak states, Internal divisions, strategic maritime routes, and competing foreign interests. If the tensions between the two former allies escalates into a full fledged war, it won’t stay a bilateral conflict.

Meanwhile, ongoing war in Sudan, insurgence in Somalia, and Ethiopia’s internal unrest in Amhara and Oromia, have left the region on edge.

Analysts warn that any renewed conflict involving Eritrea and Ethiopia could further destabilize the Horn, trigger massive displacement and migration, and complicate the already fragile humanitarian situation in the region.

A Tigray divided and exploited by its former enemies

Amid the rising tensions, both Ethiopia and Eritrea appear to be maneuvering to expand their influence, Tigray once a common enemy during the two years of war, but now emerging as a fragmented political landscape.

Both Asmara and Addis Ababa are attempting to exploit the internal split within the ruling political establishment. Eritrea is reportedly trying to align the TPLF, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, while Ethiopia’s federal government supports the political group led by Getachew Reda, former deputy chairman of the TPLF and head of the Interim Administration.

While both sides within Tigray claim to represent the interests of the Tigrayan people, the deepening divisions have made Tigray more vulnerable to external manipulation.

Several Tigrayan political and civil society leaders have expressed concern that Tigray is being dragged into a geopolitical tug of war that could derail its fragile peace.

For Tigray, caught between competing forces and fractured from within, the cost of another war is going to be catastrophic.

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The newly emerging armed group says it has entered Tigray sparking fear of intra-civil war

Few months ago a new armed faction composed of Senior former Tigray Defense Forces commanders, fighters and interim administration officials has declared its intent to overthrow the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, stoking fears that the war-torn Tigray could be sliding into an intra-civil war.

The group, which calls itself the Tigray Peace Force, was established after the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and elements within the TDF forcibly retook control of several local administrations across Tigray, pushing out officials of the interim administration.

The group claims to fight for the political “liberation” of Tigray from what it calls an authoritarian and exclusionary rule by the TPLF.

“Our mission is to snatch power from the TPLF and its affiliates within the TDF who continue to hold the people of Tigray hostage,” Shewit Bitew, one of the prominent figures in the new armed group stated.

Multiple sources suggest the group has received logistical and financial support from the federal government, a charge Addis Ababa has not publicly addressed.

Many warn that the support from the Federal government, could be a destabilizing factor in the already fragile region and may indicate federal strategy to containing or weakening the TPLF and TDF, despite the peace agreement.

After months of regrouping and training in Ethiopia’s Afar region, the group claims to have now entered Tigray.

Military commanders in the TDF have begun openly threatening to take action against the newly formed armed group.

This development has heightened tensions in Tigray still reeling from a brutal two-year war, which officially ended with the Pretoria Peace Agreement in November 2022.

Tigray’s Fragile Post-War Peace

Following the cessation of hostilities, the TPLF reasserted control over much of Tigray’s political apparatus. While hailed by some as a stabilizing force, others see the party’s return to dominance as a betrayal of the sacrifices of those who fought and lost their lives in the fight not only for the survival of the people but for a better democratic future ahead.

“People are frustrated. We fought a war hoping to liberate Tigray from external domination, but we ended up under internal authoritarianism,” said a former TDF fighter now part of the armed group.

Many say the formation of the armed group is a symptom of growing political fragmentation within Tigray, as well as lingering dissatisfaction among ex-combatants who feel their cause has been betrayed by their leaders and commanders.

TPLF and TDF officials, however, have publicly dismissed the new group as “externally influenced” and “criminals,” accusing the federal government of exploiting divisions to weaken Tigray.

The Making of the Tigray Peace Force

The TPF emerged after the TPLF, along with elements of the TDF, forcibly retook control of local administrations across Tigray earlier this year. This pushed out officials from the interim administration, some of whom later regrouped and helped form the new armed group.

Those aligned with the TPF accuse the TPLF of reversing the sacrifices made by the people by consolidating power and failing to deliver political reform or economic recovery. Former fighters say they feel their cause has been abandoned by the military and political leadership.

Although their exact strength and territorial presence remain unclear the group is composed of TDF officers, rank-and-file fighters, and former officials from the ousted interim administration led by Getachew Reda., the armed group and have already begun to influence discourse within Tigrayan.

It is reportedly gaining traction among various segments of the population who are dissatisfied with the political and military leadership and also the economic hardship brought on by the devastating war on Tigray.

Observers say the TPF does not yet pose a conventional threat to the TDF. However, even symbolic challenges could erode internal cohesion within the TDF, many of whose veterans harbor grievances over post-war treatment and a lack of economic reintegration.

Proxy Pressures and Foreign Hands

The timing of the TPF’s emergence is particularly noteworthy, coinciding with increasing tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea governments.

Multiple sources and analysts say the group’s operations in Afar were tolerated, if not outright enabled by federal government, raising questions about Addis Ababa’s role in exacerbating tensions in the post-war region.

At the same time, many reports suggest that the TPLF is receiving quiet backing from Eritrea, its former wartime enemy. Despite the bitter history of Eritreas involvement in the war on Tigray reports alleged that Asmara may be investing in a TPLF led political bloc to counterbalance rising tensions between the Ethiopian and Eritrean government.

However the people caught in between, are the same civilians who survived airstrikes, famine, mass displacement and gross human rights violations committed by both the Ethiopian and Eritreans governments only two years ago.

What Lies Ahead?

For many in Tigray, the scars of the last war remain fresh, and the prospect of internal bloodshed is a chilling one.

“I lost my brother fighting for Tigray,” said Aregawi, a resident of Mekelle. “Now I’m told we might fight each other. That’s not the future we wanted.”

While full scale conflict is not inevitable, the signs are troubling. The return of armed political movements, growing disillusionment with leadership, and unresolved political threaten to undo progress made since 2022.

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The Unmaking of the Pretoria Agreement: A fragile peace fractured by the structural flaws and impunity.

When the Pretoria Agreement was signed on November 2, 2022, it was hailed as a turning point. An African-brokered blueprint to end one of the deadliest wars of the 21st century. But more than two years later, the deal’s promises are unraveling.

The Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent speech to Parliament, suggest not just a breakdown in trust but a wholesale reversal of the agreement’s core tenets.

The Pretoria deal, facilitated by the African Union with support from the U.S. and others, promised “silencing the guns,” addressing underlying issues based upon the Ethiopian constitution and rebuilding Tigray.

It required the disarmament of Tigray’s forces, restoration of services, unfettered humanitarian access, withdrawal of non-ENDF and foreign forces from Tigray and restoration of the constitutional framework.

However the architecture of the agreement is fundamentally flawed. Lacking robust and effective enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, it was built more on political optimism than practical enforceability.

There is no independent body with the authority to verify compliance or penalize violations. This vacuum has allowed both sides to exploit ambiguity, delay implementation, and at times resume hostile posturing with impunity.

Now, with renewed threats of war looming, it is critical to dissect how this failure in peace architecture has jeopardized not just Tigray’s future, but Ethiopia’s and the Horn Of Africas broader stability.

What Pretoria Actually Promised

The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, was a brief but ambitious framework. The core commitments of the Pretoria agreement includes Permanent cessation of hostilities, Disarmament of Tigray forces that is going to take place concurrently with the withdrawal of foreign and non-ENDF forces per the agreement, Restoration of constitutional order in Tigray, Resumption of unhindered humanitarian access, Withdrawal of foreign and non-federal forces, Lifting of the terrorist designation of the TPLF, transitional justice, and political dialogue to address underlying political issues.

Structural Flaws in the Agreement

The unmaking of Pretoria cannot be understood solely as a consequence of bad actors. From the outset, the Pretoria Agreement was celebrated more for what it represented than what it actually enforced.

While it succeeded in halting large scale fighting, its clauses were vague, open to interpretation and utterly lacking in enforceability.

One of the most glaring structural weaknesses was the absence of an independent monitoring and verification mechanism. Though the African Union was tasked with oversight, it was given neither the tools nor the mandate to enforce compliance. Its Monitoring, Verification and Compliance Mission has remained largely symbolic, with limited access, no coercive power, and somehow lacking credibility among actors.

Equally problematic was the exclusion of international guarantors or punitive mechanisms. The deal did not bind the parties to external arbitration or sanction in case of violation. Unlike successful peace accords elsewhere the Pretoria pact lacked a deterrent against backsliding. Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan authorities both had little to lose and much to manipulate.

Silent Violations and Derailed Promises

The most damning failure of the Pretoria Agreement is the continued occupation of large parts of western and northern Tigray by Amhara regional forces and Eritrean troops who were supported to leave Tigray per the Pretoria agreement.

According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, despite the cessation of hostilities agreement the occupying forces have continued to commit widespread and systematic abuses, including arbitrary arrests, looting, sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing. Amhara forces have continued to expel thousands of ethnic Tigrayans in defiance of the agreement.

Eritrean troops, meanwhile, have not only refused to withdraw, but have reportedly carried out killings, abductions, and looting in northeastern Tigray, including in Irob, Gulomakeda, and other areas.

The agreement also promised the returning of internally displaced persons, but nearly 1 million displaced Tigrayans remain in makeshift camps across the region, now enduring their fifth rainy season in plastic shelters.

Basic needs like food, medicine, clean water are scarcely met. Numerous reports noted that the situation in displacement camps remains dire.

Meanwhile, the much-touted reconstruction effort has all but collapsed. No comprehensive rehabilitation plan has been launched. Schools, hospitals, and administrative buildings remain largely in rubble.

Systematically Ignored constitutional violations.

Among the most crucial elements of the Pretoria Agreement was its commitment to constitutional order. The parties pledged to “respect and uphold the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.” In practice, that clause has been repeatedly violated by both parties.

The Federal government rather than facilitating the reintegration of Tigray’s constitutionally administrative territories in line with the constitutional structure, the federal government has taken a radically different path. Italy is actively empowering the very forces that are supposed to leave Tigray.

These forces, originating from the Amhara region, have been granted political legitimacy, military support, and federal training and armament, a blatant deviation from both the constitution and the spirit of the Pretoria Agreement.

According to multiple reports, the federal government has equipped these militias with weapons and logistical aid, while turning a blind eye to its commitment to abide by the Ethiopian constitution as well as the Pretoria agreement.

On the other side, elements within the TPLF are reportedly unauthorized negotiations and political dealings with armed groups in the neighboring Amhara region, as well as pursuing backchannel communications with the Eritrean government, bypassing the constitutional framework.

The Costs of a Failed Peace

A return to war is not hypothetical, it is plausible. And the consequences would be staggering. The 2020–2022 war killed an estimated 600,000 people, displaced millions, and destroyed a generation’s access to education, health care, and economic opportunity.

Another war would trigger fresh humanitarian catastrophe, destabilize the already fragile peace in the Horn of Africa, and push the country into a more dangerous path.

The consequences of the unmaking of the Pretoria agreement are not just political and security issues, they are profoundly economic. A country that has already suffered immense war-related destruction is teetering on the edge of economic collapse.

Pretoria was supposed to pave the way for economic recovery. But the political instability and unresolved conflict dynamics have produced the opposite.

Ethiopia is now facing runaway inflation, a crippling foreign exchange shortage, and a looming debt crisis. The birr continues to slide against major currencies, driving up the cost of imports and compounding food insecurity.

The failure of upholding the fragile peace in Tigray will not just be a mere political failure but it will it is a full-blown economic disaster that will push the country into a further crisis.

What Must Be Done

The international community must stop pretending the Pretoria Agreement is working. It must urgently push for a revised peace framework, one that includes robust international monitoring, clear timelines and a punitive measures for violations.

It must be agreed that the African Unilateral alone cannot safeguard this fragile peace. A stronger coalition, including the UN, EU, and U.S., must back enforcement.

At home, leaders on all sides must be held to account. Peace must not be a public relations tool, it must be a commitment enforced through law, diplomacy, and justice.

The people of Tigray, like all Ethiopians, deserve more than rhetorical ceasefires and symbolic gestures. They deserve security, dignity, and the right to live without fear of another war.

The unmaking of the Pretoria Agreement is a cautionary tale about peace without enforcement. Ethiopia still has a chance to reverse course. But that window is closing fast. If war returns, it won’t just be a failure of diplomacy it will be a failure of moral and political will.

And the world will bear witness to another catastrophe it could have helped prevent.

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It’s Okay if You Invest it in Tigray: A Subtle Nod to Illicit Mining and dirty money.

In politics, words carry weight, especially when they come from those tasked with leading the government and insuring rule of law. That’s why a single remark by Tigray’s Interim Administration President, General Tadesse Werede, has set off alarm bells among those who fear Tigray’s post-war recovery is sliding into the hands of the very networks that profited from chaos.

On Saturday during a meeting with a task force charged with cracking down on illicit gold mining, President Tadesse made a startling admission and an even more startling suggestion.

“Yes, the majority of illegal mining is done by Tigrayans,” he said. “If the money you get from illegal mining is invested in Tigray, it is better.”

For a region struggling to claw its way out of the ruins of war, those words may prove far more damaging than any amount of gold smuggled out in the dead of night.

A flourishing illicit gold economy

Since the outbreak of war in late 2020, Tigray’s formal economy has been devastated. Blockades, infrastructure destruction, Institutions breakdown and the collapse on the law enforcement agencies have crippled trade and legitimate business activities.

In this economic void exacerbated by the near-total absence of investments and a gutted formal economy sector, gold has emerged as Tigray’s most lucrative and most heavily exploited natural resource.

This is not a simple story of local miners eking out a living. The scale and sophistication of operations have increased dramatically. Gold mining now involves industrial scale extraction and processing, often using toxic chemicals like mercury and cyanide that have poisoned rivers and farmlands.

According to a recent study conducted by Mekelle University to extract just one tonne of gold, miners must excavate roughly 140 hectares of land. This massive disruption has accelerated desertification, with vegetation cover in Tigray plummeting from 13.51% to 10.5% in the past two years, a decline driven primarily by illegal mining activities.

The financial impact is equally staggering. The task force established in December last year to tackle the illicit gold mining said Tigray was expected to receive over 7 billion birr in royalties from gold mining this year, only 24 million birr has been earned so far, reflecting severe revenue losses due to rampant illegal mining and trafficking.

Behind this environmental destruction and economic hemorrhage lie a well-organized illegal mining networks deeply entwined with Tigray’s political, military and economic elite.

Multiple reports allege that key figures within the interim administration and armed forces control mining concessions, offer protection to illegal operators, and facilitate smuggling routes that bypass official oversight.

These networks have exploited the chaos wrought by war and Tigray’s fragile governance structures to enrich themselves, often at the direct expense of local communities. The contamination of water sources and the destruction of farmland have devastated traditional livelihoods, while the illicit profits continue to flow into the hands of a privileged few.

It is against this backdrop that General Tadesse Werede’s comment that if the proceeds of illegal mining are invested locally, then it is fine must be understood. Far from being a pragmatic nod to economic realities, it risks signalling a dangerous tolerance, even acceptance of the illicit economy flourishing under his administration’s watch.

A tacit green light to corruption and impunity

General Tadesse Werede’s remark that it is acceptable to invest money derived from illegal mining within Tigray sends a chilling message to anyone hoping for justice and genuine reform in the region. Rather than confronting the illicit gold economy head-on, his words offer what amounts to a tacit endorsement of criminality, wrapped in the language of economic pragmatism.

This kind of reasoning is not new in fragile, post-conflict settings. Around the world, authorities have repeatedly fallen into the trap of legitimizing war-era “shadow economies” in the name of “investment” or “stability.” Yet time and again, these short-sighted compromises have only entrenched corruption, distorted local economies, and perpetuated cycles of violence and mistrust.

By implying that the source of wealth can be ignored as long as the proceeds circulate locally, General Tadesse’s statement sends a clear signal to powerful actors embedded in these illicit networks that accountability is negotiable, enforcement is flexible, and political protection is guaranteed.

Such signals undermine the very foundations of governance in Tigray at a critical juncture. They blur the line between legal and illegal economic activity, weakening the rule of law and eroding public trust in institutions already battered by years of war and political instability.

Furthermore, this approach rewards those who have capitalized Tigray’s chaos, military figures and civil administrators alike many of whom are alleged to have direct involvement in mining concessions, protection rackets, and smuggling operations. Instead of dismantling these networks, the administration risks cementing their influence and enabling the continued plundering of Tigray’s natural wealth.

The urgent need for uncompromising accountability

Tigray stands at a crossroads. The promise of rebuilding after years of devastating conflict cannot coexist with a tacit acceptance of illicit economies flourishing under the protection of those meant to lead. General Tadesse Werede’s offhand remark, far from a mere slip, reveals a deeper reluctance to confront the entrenched corruption that threatens to derail recovery and justice.

Accountability cannot be conditional. It cannot hinge on whether the proceeds of illegal activities are “invested” locally or sent abroad. To tolerate illicit mining even under the guise of economic pragmatism, is to undermine the rule of law and to send a message that some are above scrutiny.

For governance to take root in Tigray, leaders must dismantle the networks that fuel illegal mining, regardless of their political or military background or connections. This requires transparent investigations, prosecutions, and reforms that place public interest above private gain.

The stakes are immense. Without decisive action, Tigray risks entrenching a war economy that perpetuates environmental destruction, economic inequality, and political instability. Worse, it risks alienating the very communities whose trust and support are essential for lasting peace.

The road to recovery demands leadership that refuses shortcuts, that prioritizes justice over expediency, and that rejects the dangerous notion that crime can be justified by where the money flows. Anything less is a betrayal of the people and future of Tigray.